

UNREVISED / NON RÉVISÉ

## THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

OTTAWA, Monday, May 12, 2003

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 6:00 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.

**Senator Colin Kenny** (*Chairman*) in the Chair.

**The Chairman:** It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. My name is Colin Kenny. I chair the committee, and I am a senator from Ontario.

On my immediate right is the distinguished senator from Nova Scotia, Senator Michael Forrestall. Senator Forrestall has served the constituents of Dartmouth for the past 37 years, first as their member of the House of Commons and then as their senator. Throughout his parliamentary career, he has followed defence matters and served on various defence-related parliamentary committees, including the 1993 special joint committee on the future of the Canadian Forces.

Senator Jack Wiebe served as lieutenant governor of the province and as a member of the Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly before his appointment to the Senate in the year 2000.

(1810 follows, Chairman continuing, Senator Wiebe is deputy chair)

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(Following 1800, The Chairman, in the year 2000. 1810 BEGINS HERE, the Chairman continues:)

\*\*\* Senator Wiebe is deputy chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and also sits on the Standing Senate Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament, as well as on our subcommittee on veterans affairs.

Senator Cordy is from Nova Scotia. She was an accomplished educator with an extensive record of community involvement before coming to the Senate in the year 2000. In addition to serving on our committee, she has been a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology that recently released a landmark report on health care and is now studying mental health. She was recently elected vice-chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association.

Senator Banks is from Alberta. Senator Banks is well known to Canadians as one of our most accomplished and versatile musicians and entertainers. He was appointed to the Senate in the year 2000. Senator Banks is chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources. Currently, this committee is studying nuclear safety and control.

Our committee is the first permanent Senate committee mandated to examine security and defence. Over the past 18 months, we have completed a number of reports, beginning with Canadian Security and Military Preparedness. This study, which was tabled in February 2002, examined the major defence and security issues facing Canada.

Then the Senate asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. So far, we have released three reports on various aspects of national security: first, the Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, published in September of 2002; second, An Update on Canada's Military Crisis: A View from the Bottom Up, published in November 2002; and, most recently, The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, published in January 2003.

The committee is continuing its long-term evaluation of Canada's ability to contribute to security and defence in North America. As part of its work, the committee has been holding hearings on the federal government support to the men and women across the country who respond first to emergencies and disasters. However, the committee has decided to give priority to an ongoing evaluation of Canada's ability to defend its territorial waters and help police the continental coastline.

These hearings update an earlier committee report, Defence of North America, published in September 2002, which found Canadian coastal defence efforts to be largely ad hoc and fragmentary.

Our first witnesses will be from the Navy League of Canada, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Gary L. Garnett, National Vice-President for Maritime Affairs of the Navy League. He is accompanied by Captain (Ret'd) John Dewar, Member, Maritime Affairs, also of the Navy League of Canada.

Admiral Garnett retired in 2001, after a 38-year career in the Canadian Forces. At the time of his retirement, he was completing a four-year tour as Vice-Chief of Defence Staff. He was a weapons specialist sea-going naval officer. His senior naval appointments included Commander, Maritime Forces, Atlantic, and Commander, Maritime Command. At National Defence headquarters, his appointments included Executive Assistant to the Chief of Defence Staff, Director of Maritime Development and Chief of Personnel Services.

Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. I understand you have a short statement to make, and you may begin.

**Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Gary L. Garnett, National Vice-President for Maritime Affairs, Navy League of Canada:** I will add to my bio that I started my time in uniform as a Navy League cadet and followed by being a Sea Cadet in Hamilton, Ontario in the 1950s.

Captain Dewar retired after a 32-year career in the Canadian Forces. Currently, he works for CFN Consultants and sits on our maritime affairs committee and is our representative for the Conference of Defence Associations.

I will begin by offering background on the organization we represent. Navy League of Canada was founded in 1895 with a broad-based mandate to promote Canada's maritime interests, and, particularly, at that time, the need for a Canadian navy. I am very proud of the role the Navy League played in the establishment of Canada's naval service in 1910. We are proud also of our youth training programs. Established in 1917, our youth training initiative has evolved into two separate programs, the Navy League Cadets, for youths 10 to 13, and the Royal Canadian Sea Cadets, for youths 12 to 18.

Currently, these organizations are comprised of approximately 15,000 young Canadians, 5,000 adult members and 251 communities nationwide.

The modern Navy League defines three separate operational areas: first, the Sea Cadet Program, operated in partnership with the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces; second, the Navy League Cadets, our own junior youth program; and, third, Maritime Affairs, which has brought us here today.

I am pleased to have been invited to deliver the Navy League's perspective on the need for a national maritime security policy and the need for increased interoperability between or the integration of the various departments and agencies that share responsibility for maritime security in Canada.

As you are aware, the Navy League has recently published a discussion paper entitled Canada: An Incomplete Maritime Nation. Many of my discussion items have been addressed in the national security portion of this paper, but I wish to amplify certain key points that relate to maritime security.

The Navy League holds a broad view of national security and the traditional concept of military protection of sovereignty. National security represents the preservation of the nation's people, resources and culture. Threats to national security include those that are political, such as threat of military or terrorist activity, and those that are criminal, economic, ecological or health-based. It is this broad definition that has been used to frame my remarks. Our paper defines the heart and soul of effective maritime security as knowing exactly what is happening in all waters under Canadian jurisdiction, including the Arctic.

To do this, three criteria must be met: know exactly who is using those waters; maintain an unequivocal expression of government authority; be able to respond quickly and effectively to violations of the law or threats to national security.

At the heart of the matter is information. Information needs to be collected and fused into one clear geospatial intelligence picture.

The navy currently operates maritime operation centres in Halifax and Victoria. They have been tasked as non-deployed, operational level command centres, in accordance with the 1994 White Paper. Co-located with them are the joint Canadian Forces-Coast Guard search and rescue centres.

However, testimony you have heard from various sources, including the Canadian Coast Guard, the RCMP and the navy clearly indicate our approach to maritime security has been, in your own words, "fragmented and largely ad hoc." There is a need for the government to clearly task the maritime operation centres with the role of establishing and maintaining what we call the "total picture" of what is happening at sea. You have discussed this concept of regional or national intelligence coordination centres with various witnesses. It is our view that the picture should be compiled locally on each coast and then provided to a national centre, which will have many additional roles, such as commanding deployed Canadian forces, operations beyond that of pure domestic security.

Firstly, a maritime security centre or operations centre or whatever we wish to call it must have intelligence, fusion and decision making components, giving it the ability to identify and evaluate threats and implement any appropriate response. These centres would most logically be managed by the navy but must include permanent officers or officials from other government departments, such as DFO, RCMP, CCRA, Environment, Customs, et cetera. These officers would coordinate intelligence efforts and advise the command structure as subject matter experts for their field of expertise.

When important responses or threats or crises are being considered, higher level officials from their respective departments would move into this maritime operation centre, and these officers would then act as their staff officers. We see great benefit in integrating maritime security centres with the existing naval operational centres and command structure. Technology enables the real-time sharing of information, and it is certainly possible to add additional strategic level intelligence nationally without hampering the operational effectiveness obtained by close coordination at the coastal level.

Given that intelligence is the most important aspect of security, we cannot afford to nickel and dime the infrastructure that will process the information. The argument of "it is less expensive to create one than to create two" does not hold water, considering the many and varied functions that will be the hallmark of any single national centre. The ability to build on fused information that has already been processed in other certified operation centres like these coastal ones or NORAD or NATO or deployed joint force commanders will much better serve the national strategic level Canadian commander or government official in charge.

Effective utilization of these centres will depend largely on our ability to collect and then fuse the information.

(Take 1820 follows, Mr. Garnett continuing: The Navy League...)

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(Following take 1810: Mr. Garnett, fuse the information. TAKE 1820 BEGINS HERE: Mr. Garnett continuing)

The Navy League is particularly concerned about our nation's intelligence collection capability. This includes human intelligence, signals intelligence and surveillance, be it aeronautical, surface or subsurface. Each is of concern. Given that Canada has over 240,000 kilometres of coastline and almost 10 million square kilometres of ocean territory, we see an urgent need to add the wide area surveillance capability, such as satellites and long-range, unmanned aerial vehicles such as Global Hawk -- which, incidentally, could fly in the Arctic for over 24 hours at a time -- to the current mix of surveillance assets. Without these tools we will never have a true picture of what is happening in our ocean approaches and coastal territories.

Monitoring capabilities will be enhanced by the use of vessel transponders and could be further enhanced by deploying more high-frequency surface-wave radars than those currently planned for just the choke points.

Beyond surveillance there is a need to integrate the intelligence and knowledge resources held by the various government departments. I call your attention to the COINPAC overview attached to my presentation. The Cooperative Ocean Information Network Pacific is a joint public-private sector

initiative that could serve as a model for information-sharing between government agencies or as a baseline on which to build the broader security picture.

I have talked at length about the need for intelligence collection and information processing, as well as the decision-making mechanisms required to coordinate an appropriate response. This should cover the first of our three criteria: to know who exactly is using our waters. The second criterion is to maintain an unequivocal expression of government authority in our waters. The simple presence of government flag vessels is a powerful deterrent to security threats. The mix of vessels should include navy, Coast Guard, fisheries, RCMP, or those of any other government agencies. The important thing is to maintain a presence in our coastal and inland waterways. We currently fall short of this requirement. As an illustration, I call your attention to the *Globe and Mail* article, "Return of the Vikings," attached to my presentation. This article details the need to maintain a presence in our inland waterways and also illustrates how our longstanding neglect of the Arctic has jeopardized our sovereignty claim to that territory.

If Canada is ever to achieve maritime security, we must be able to maintain an at-sea presence in all our ocean approaches and waterways, including the Arctic. Again, I emphasize the fact that these need not always be warships. As discussed in our paper, there is a clear need for environmental protection, scientific research and marine safety. Vessels used for these purposes by virtue of their Canadian flag fill the requirement for presence.

However, this brings me to the third criterion for maritime security: to be able to respond quickly and effectively to violations of the law or threats to national security. I have touched on this during my remarks on maritime security centres, but only from the intelligence and structural aspects. I would like to cover the operational aspects of response.

Clearly, the navy is our best resource when it comes to responding to security threats. It has the operational intelligence expertise and force protection capability, making it the logical choice for a lead agency. However, our naval resources are stretched very thin and are not capable of meeting all our domestic security demands and supporting foreign policy at the same time. Although this could be resolved with a massive infusion of cash and personnel, neither appears likely to happen to the degree that would be required.

In addition, the requirements for naval vessels are substantially different from those required for much of the non-military aspects of maritime security. You do not need a frigate or fisheries patrols for search and rescue, except during those times of the year when the weather is such that they could be the most appropriate vessels to sail, or the threat is of significance.

The more practical solution that must be considered is to redevelop our Coast Guard with an interdiction and enforcement capability. As the Auditor General noted, the current mission and resources of the Coast Guard are not in balance. Thus, the addition of any new mission would have to follow the stabilization of the current one. As you have heard in testimony from Commissioner Adams, the current mandate and capabilities of the Coast Guard limit it to tracking, monitoring and reporting, or serving as a ferry service for other government departments. Is this the best use of the Coast Guard? The option of providing the Coast Guard with vessels and crews that have the capability to interdict and quarantine vessels, conduct emergency spill response, sea management, and operate more frequently in the Arctic and conduct search and rescue to our 200 nautical mile limit -- in other words, to become more like the U.S. Coast Guard -- needs to be considered by government in the broader context of maritime security.

If it is decided to proceed in this manner, then the Coast Guard may -- and I emphasize "may" -- need to be moved to the Department of National Defence and come under the umbrella of the navy. The development of an integrated fleet of government vessels coordinated by maritime security centres would allow Canada to meet the third criterion for maritime security: to be able to respond quickly and effectively to violations of the law or threats to national security.

To have clarity of mandate and jurisdictional authorities in the area of maritime security clearly spelled out will require the development of a comprehensive maritime security policy. It is very clear that there is a policy vacuum in the maritime security arena. This is probably best illustrated in the testimony you received from Mr. Haydon about who is driving the bus. At present I am not sure it is possible to answer that question. If the department in charge is the one with the least resource and capability, then the need for a maritime security policy is even more urgent, and the task should be undertaken without delay.

However, the effectiveness of this policy would be limited without the development of a comprehensive oceans management policy. This was a critical point of our discussion paper: the need for an oceans management policy to address security, offshore resources, industrial development, environmental protection, scientific research, marine safety and shipping issues that are critical to the development of our maritime sector. This policy vacuum needs to be filled quickly, as there are clearly identifiable gaps in our ability to meet the requirements of maritime security. Our paper urges the government to apply considerable policy-making resources and a broad consultative process to this initiative.

The Navy League of Canada is eager to provide any assistance we can. We recognize that the best way to preserve our people, our culture and our natural resources is to identify and respond to threats before they reach our shore. As such, we identify the need for a maritime security policy as both immediate and essential.

Throughout our 108-year history, the volunteers the Navy League of Canada have been pleased to support our country, through our work with youth, our support of the navy and merchant marine, especially during times of war, and by working in a collaborative and cooperative approach with our government to address the many maritime issues that affect the health of our nation.

I wish to thank you for your invitation to testify today and I look forward to future dialogue on these important issues.

**Senator Banks:** We have heard representations before about these questions and I suspect you may have read some of them. I would be interested in an overview in even more detail than you have already given to us on your opinions with respect to two questions. One concerns the fact that some countries have a kind of maritime force that looks after the security in the littoral area -- that is inshore -- and a navy that deals with deep sea matters. Some countries integrate those functions effectively and have them performed by one force, usually the navy. Do you think that is a good idea?

Second, you have said that in order to enforce sovereignty it is not necessary that we have a warship some place, but must not a ship, wherever it is, need to be able to perform enforcement of some kind, other than flying the flag? Does it not need to have some kind of teeth? Are we not absent that now in the case of the considerable number of ships, and in some cases the considerable ships of the Coast Guard, who can only, as far as I know, fly the flag, unless they happen to be ferrying a policeman or an enforcement officer of some kind? If they do not have such a passenger, they cannot really do anything. We are wrestling with that issue. You referred to moving toward the American model and we are a long way from that now.

What is your view of a combined force that looks after both the inshore and offshore? What do you think we ought to do to put the Coast Guard to better use, as far as security is concerned?

(Take 1830 follows: Mr. Garnett new speaker: In essence, as far as your first question)

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(following tk 1820--Banks...as far as security is concerned?)

**Mr. Garnett:** In essence, as far as your first question is concerned, there are really two options. I do not think we want to proceed to the U.S. Coast Guard model where there is no naval presence and where the Coast Guard has responsibility for the first 200 miles. Development of that capacity within our Coast Guard -- and this testimony has already been given -- would take two generations.

Regarding the second part of your question, our current Coast Guard has no enforcement capability by virtue of either legislation or training. That is where we need to focus and to better integrate, in an operations sense, the use of the Coast Guard and the navy.

**Senator Banks:** How would you do that? If money were not in question, what would be the logistics, the mechanics? How would you reorganize a more efficient and effective use -- if that is the right word -- of the ships' resources in the current Coast Guard? We are tap-dancing around. What would you do right now to fix it within a year?

**Mr. Garnett:** The key is the role of the operations centres or security centres and the authorities that are given to those centres and to the navy that runs them. In other words, they should not just act

as collectors of information but they should have decision-making and command authority over all the vessels. The centres would not have to say what the vessels will do but they would ensure that the vessels will act in concert with what everybody else is doing.

In addition, the Coast Guard should have some broader mandated role. That can be done in a variety of ways. We need not train every vessel and every crewmember in interdiction. That training could be done in a much smaller piece of the organization.

The U.S. Coast Guard, for example, due to a variety of legislative rules in the United States, puts boarding teams on the U.S. navy ships to do anti-drug or drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean. They have hired and trained a group of expert teams who are put on board ships. A similar kind of organization could be arranged with our Coast Guard for the vessels that work in the areas where those opportunities might exist. Again, the operation could be run out of those Maritime operations centres as a quasi-police function to cover the breadth of activities that we want to interdict.

**Senator Banks:** Assuming we could find a way to accommodate those new crewmembers for living space, there could be several of them on a small cutter and five or six or ten on a larger ship?

**Mr. Garnett:** A couple of Zodiacs could be used.

**Senator Banks:** They would all have some kind of enforcement capability then?

**Mr. Garnett:** It need not be all vessels and it need not be all the time, but the coordination security centres could run the operation in the broader picture.

**Captain (N) (Ret'd) John Dewar, Member, Maritime Affairs, Navy League of Canada:** I want to return to your first question about the areas of jurisdiction as well as the capability of the services that are delivering it. To my mind, it is not really a question of geography in the way that the boundary has been delineated, for example, between the U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard. It is a matter of functions. Even within the United States Coast Guard, a number of functions are performed, only some of which are dedicated to constabulary and law-enforcement activities. Much of the responsibility is due to the capabilities of the vessels themselves. The United States Coast Guard performs many of the same functions as our own Coast Guard -- maintenance of navigation aids, buoy-tending, ice-breaking, et cetera. The ships that fill those roles are not necessarily well suited to interdiction activities.

The vessels that do that type of activity -- the larger, high-endurance cutters that work further offshore and the smaller patrol vessels -- are very similar to naval ships. Many of the Coast Guard ships have the ability to integrate into the United States Navy and to do very similar types of functions.

The function of each ship is an important question, as is the training of the various people who carry out the different activities. As you know, we did some experiments in Canada using naval officers as fishery protection officers. There was some question of whether that would be a useful synergy because they happened to be at sea anyway. However, the training to make an effective fisheries officer is fairly lengthy, as is the training to make a naval officer. By the time you combine those two functions, there is a lot of overlap and redundancy in the training.

Those jobs cannot be done without the training. To a naval officer with my experience and, I would suggest, to most of my colleagues, one block of frozen fish looked pretty much like any other block of frozen fish. It takes a very detailed set of skills and knowledge to be able to perform those sorts of functions. There are two questions: One is the type of ships that perform the roles and the functions -- not just the geography -- and second is the type of people embarked in those vessels

General, broad activity can be done by naval people or with RCMP, as is done in the marine divisions. To put the right skills in the right ship at the right time is the task at hand right now. What is the best way to deliver that ability with the fleet mixes that we have? It is not just a question of geography but a question of deciding the functions of the ships, regardless of the colours painted on the sides. Then we must distribute the right number of people on those ships with the right amount of training to deliver the services required.

**Senator Wiebe:** I would like to have your view on what we would call the thin line between choosing to move the Coast Guard, for example, to the Department of National Defence, or to move it under the umbrella of the navy. Where is that thin line?

For example, the policing for law and order within our country rests with the provincial police and/or the RCMP. When we had a crisis at Oka, we called in the army because the police felt, in their own minds, that they could not handle the situation.

Does the Coast Guard have the responsibility of law and order and peace within our coastal waters? Would we be taking a step outside the historical role of our Armed Forces if we asked the navy to be a part of policing as well?

**Mr. Garnett:** There are several aspects to your question.

First, the role the Canadian Forces is the defence of Canada and North America. The forces have historically recognized that but there had not been too much of a recognizable threat until 9/11, an event which really changed the notion of "domestic first" as an "okay" sort of phrase.

One of the major issues in a defence and foreign policy review must relate to that question: What does "domestic first" mean to the Canadian Forces? There are a whole bunch of issues surrounding that question. Until there is a broad review of defence policy, I would not want to hazard the answers. I have been involved in some work with the Defence Scientific Advisory Board, work that very much suggests a need for a larger domestic role for the Canadian Forces in the future. Albeit there has been a first-priority defensive policy, that policy has not been highly visible. To me that is a huge question. I set that aside as something Professor Middlemiss may address because he works in the foreign and defence policy arena.

In the second part of the question you have fleets in being. You have a Coast Guard, you have fisheries, you have some RCMP cutters or small vessels, and you have a navy. On average, the way that the navy has looked at changing capabilities would take from 7 to 15 years -- to think of a new ship or a new capability, to design it, to build it and to train people to use it. From the kind of questions that you are asking, it seems you do not want to wait 7 to 15 years to do something.

(tk 1840 begins--Mr. Garnett cont-- We must look at what is in place)

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(Take 1840 begins, Mr. Garnett continuing...do something.)

We must look at what is in place now and how best do we use what is there. I suggest that it is not necessary to change the role of the Coast Guard into all enforcement. We have just had a discussion with Senator Banks where we offered some options around how better to use what is there now.

There is a second question, thinking in the longer term: Do we want a U.S. Coast Guard that has, as John Dewar says, all those traditional ice breaking, buoy tending activities, et cetera, which is a separate piece of the Coast Guard from the one we more colloquially know which is really a navy? The U.S. Coast Guard is the eleventh largest navy in the world with the ninth largest Air Force of interest. That is some way down the road, if we want to do that.

The more urgent question is how do we better use what we have to give us more comfort that there is a broader Maritime security capability and then where is the policy and what direction is needed to do that? Does that answer your question?

**Senator Banks:** Parenthetical to everything else we are talking about, the amount of land that we control, including land under the sea, is much less right now than if Canada ratified the Law of the Sea. Can you give us a couple of sentences with regard to your view on that?

**Mr. Garnett:** That is a huge policy question. I sat at a seminar at Dalhousie with Jeffrey Pearson and talked about Law of the Sea. I do not know if Mr. Pearson has appeared here, but he would tell you how disappointed he is that we have not ratified the Law of the Sea. There is a huge issue; you ratify the Law of the Sea and you have a 10-year period to map all of that offshore area that you want to claim as your own and provide proof and justification to the United Nations that that is yours.

**Senator Banks:** They have a considerable amount of ocean that we would have to look at; is that not correct?

**Mr. Garnett:** That is true. There are some big questions in the Arctic as well.

I do not know that anybody has done an estimate, somebody probably has, in regard to how much effort and cost it would take to do this. Would 10 years be enough for Canada to do it? We have the expertise. I can name companies on the West Coast and East Coast that have the expertise.

It would have been nice if we had been doing this piece by piece as we went along. There are some initiatives of ocean mapping; there is one out of the Bedford Institute. There is one out of the Oceans Institute in Pat Bay.

As we say in our paper, those two institutes that used to be world leaders in the 1970s in marine scientific research have been severely cut back in terms of resources, funding and people, such that they are underutilized now and they have not been doing much of the research. It is a key point in the paper that we have, as a country, neglected ocean scientific research in the recent past. That relates, at least in part, to the question you have asked. This is a huge challenge. It is one that we will have to undertake sooner or later, it needs focus, effort and initiative.

**Senator Banks:** What is your opinion, should we do this sooner or later? Is this an urgent matter?

**Mr. Garnett:** We should consider addressing this matter now, rather than putting it off, which we have been doing. Our paper says that we understand why it relates to the nose and tail of the bank as the issue of the moment. We are waiting for an enforcement regime to allow us to have some international protection to enforce fisheries protection on the nose and tail of the bank. It seems we have been waiting to are a number of years to do that. How long do you continue to wait for that before you declare the more broadly raised question?

**Senator Banks:** This is a cogent question this month in particular.

I believe you partly answered the question, admiral, but do we need to build a bunch of new ships, or are we okay with what we have if we make some adaptive changes?

**Mr. Garnett:** This is again a matter of near term and long term. In the near term, we make best use of what we have and there are ways to do that and we have discussed some of them.

There must always be renewal programs for things like ships. Technology, capability and missions change. Going back 40 years U.S. Coast Guard ships are really warships, the ones that do the more offshore patrol. It seems that there is some opportunity to look at renewing ships. Someone testified to this committee that they could review the Coast Guard with \$341 million. That would not even replace *Louis Saint Laurent*. We are talking huge dollars, not \$341 million.

**Mr. Dewar:** If I could add to the question asked by Senator Banks in regard to whether renewal would require new ships, it is a matter of capacity at this time as well. I am sure Admiral Buck, in his testimony, mentioned that the operational tempo that the navy is maintaining now, in order to meet their overseas obligations and the residual capacity that is left in Canada, if you are going to add additional functions, for example to the navy, then you would require additional capacity to be able to deliver that reasonably.

It is the same with the coast guard. If you look at the coast guard tasking as it exists now, even without an extra constabulary role, in order to fulfil an additional tasking, it would require additional resources.

**Senator Banks:** Is there a gap in terms of capacity between a Maritime coastal patrol vessel, on the one hand, and a frigate or a destroyer on the other? Is there a big gap of stuff that we do not have that we should?

**Mr. Garnett:** Indeed, there is. In the early 1990s, both Admiral King, who is testifying next, and myself were in charge of naval programs. There was a vessel called the ocean corvette. He may have changed the name of it on me, because he changed the name of everything, such that I did not even know what it was.

**Senator Banks:** There are some relatives of mine who would rather that you not call anything a "corvette."

**Mr. Garnett:** There was a perceived gap of a vessel that filled that, that went faster, was certainly Atlantic and Pacific capable in that area, and was not meant to be deployed around the world, but had a capability. That endured for a number of years. We even had a project office, but that went by the wayside in one of those program review cutbacks.

**Senator Banks:** Would those plans still work? Is the basic naval architecture of that ship what we would need to fill that gap?

**Mr. Garnett:** Maybe Admiral King can answer that better than myself. Everything would need to be renewed. There is no question. Ten years' worth of technology, you will get different hull forms and engines. It would probably not be dissimilar to what the U.S. Coast Guard would call a high endurance cutter, which is around 2,000-ton type of vessel.

**Senator Banks:** Notwithstanding that we should make the best use of what we have, for the fleets in being, there is still a functional hole that cannot right now be properly filled; is that correct?

**Mr. Garnett:** That hole could be filled in a more cost effective manner than using a frigate. However, it requires resources in terms of not just building, but people. That could be a warship or a Coast Guard ship in a new Coast Guard. There would be more like that piece of the U.S. Coast Guard. You look at those two potentials. Where does it best fit in the broader perspective?

**Mr. Dewar:** The other question along with that is: If you were to build new ships to deliver that capacity, whether it were to the Coast Guard or to the navy, regardless of what colour you painted it on the outside, in addition to the changes in technology that have taken place, there are probably also policy changes that are in the midst of taking place that you would want to design into that.

Regardless of who operates it, there will still be demands and requirements put on that kind of security cutter or sovereignty vessel or whatever you would want to call it that would have to serve several jurisdictions, whether it is the RCMP afloat, CIC or CCRA. You would have an opportunity to build that in.

(Take 1850 begins, Mr. Dewar continuing: You would not resurrect...)

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(Mr. Dewar continues)

\*\* You would not resurrect a pre-existing plan, except perhaps as a basis for doing it, but there are a number of things you would want to incorporate to make it serve the kind of mandate that is being discussed here.

**Mr. Garnett:** You would probably also want to include a hull form that would be good in at least first- or second-year ice in the Arctic. There is no reason why that could not be done.

**Senator Forrestall:** Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for taking the time to share your experience with us.

Carrying on from where Senator Banks and Senator Wiebe have gone, I find it a matter of some regret that we do not have in place an ongoing, coherent, robust ship replacement program. We are now coming to the end of the life of the Tribal class. To the best of my knowledge, there is no design for its replacement. If we replace our fleet at the same rate as we are replacing our helicopters, God help Canada, regardless of who in the hell is looking after it. I sometimes get accused of being flippant when I say, "Let's call in the Halifax Rifles." They were doing it in 1749, and they did not do a bad job.

**The Chairman:** If I may intervene, I want to observe that this is the twenty-second meeting at which we have mentioned the Halifax Rifles.

**Senator Forrestall:** We have a changing North, a brand new North. What kind of vehicle should we have up there? We have shallow harbours. What kind of vehicles do we need on our coasts to get in and out of those shallow harbours in pursuit of intelligence about illegal entries and

illegal substances being brought into the country? We have none of this. Does this present a problem in your view? Can you see beyond the life of the Tribal class destroyers now? Where are we going?

**Mr. Garnett:** Not unlike some of the other platforms you mentioned, it is now entirely possible to keep a ship alive for a number of years if it has sufficient electrical power, which also relates to air conditioning. The Tribal class destroyers are already in service longer than it was anticipated they would be. When the ships were built, 25 years was considered to be the extreme life of a destroyer. They are already well beyond that and it would not surprise me if they go through another re-engineering phase to continue to keep them in service.

The platform is certainly well designed. I can tell you anecdotal stories of aircraft carriers suffering damage that the 280s or Tribals did not in various deployments, both in the Pacific and Atlantic.

My sense is that they will remain in service for a much longer period than is now anticipated. At the end of the day, we might find a new platform to replace both the Tribals and the frigates. It would be something bigger than a frigate, and even bigger than the current Tribal, because a frigate is larger than the Tribal is today. It is just a completely different hull form that gives it less of a carrying capacity of a certain nature.

I know that other alternatives were considered, the most recent being the Arleigh Burke class that the U.S. navy is producing, but it is a huge ship with a huge crew and is not well suited for the kinds of role we are interested in. Therefore, I would not be surprised to suddenly hear that the Tribals will stay in service for another considerable period.

**Mr. Dewar:** I interpreted your question to be with regard to a number of activities that may occur in the near future. You were talking about shallow bays in the Arctic and conditions that have changed up there and whether we have vessels suitable for the purpose. The answer is probably no, we do not, because no one has ever defined a requirement for vessels for that purpose. Almost all ships are built with a specific task in mind. In fact, when we talked about the different range of Coast Guard vessels, be it a buoy tender or a high-endurance cutter, all these different sorts of ships were designed for different tasks.

The functions of the frigates and the destroyers were clearly laid out in terms of meeting requirements that defined the need for the ship in the first place. It was not foreseen that it would be doing hot pursuit in coastal waters, so they were not designed for that and probably are not suitable for that sort of role.

If that is the sort of need that will have to be met, I do not think it is difficult to define the type of vessel you would have to build in order to fulfil it. It is only that no one has ever said that we need to do that. If that is a result of the shifts in policy that are currently in process and the requirement becomes identified, then it becomes an additional necessary capacity, as with the other tasks to which we were referring. If we need vessels to do that, we will have to build them, because we have not had that task before.

**Senator Forrestall:** However, you will admit that the threat has changed.

**Mr. Dewar:** Yes, it has, but the ships have not yet.

**Senator Forrestall:** What we built for one task does not fill the bill for the future. If we as a nation do not have the foresight to change, then God help us. All kinds of plans for fleet renewal are buried in dust. I doubt that the plans for the Coast Guard fleet are still viable. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans has no fleet replacement program.

We are talking about a layered marine defence. You have to be inshore, you have to be in the immediate few miles, you have to be out, and then you have to be out in the blue water. The navy can deal with the blue water. They are hard pressed, but they should function out there. From there on, in terms of maritime security, and in terms of making better friends with our southern neighbours, we do not have a hell of a lot to offer.

What if we pooled the resources of all these departments? Would it be crowding the Department of Transport too much if the government decided to put all of this under the navy?

(Take 1900 follows -- Mr. Garnett: My comment would be simply...)

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(following Forrestall – to put all of this under the navy?)

**Mr. Garnett:** My comment would be simply that it would be hugely challenging for the navy to take this on, given all the other things the navy is doing. You have been a member of government much longer than I have been a watcher of government, and it seems to me I have never seen a Canadian-made solution that would relate to what you are suggesting. In other words, a Canadian version of the Department of Homeland Security does not register in my knowledge and background of Canadian government solutions to problems.

I do not mean that in a flippant manner because I have suggested there are better ways of doing business now. Part of it is mission and mandate related to a fully operating, functioning security centre with some authority over the use and the programming of the vessels of the other departments and a clear mandate to do that and a policy framework within which to operate.

**Senator Forrestall:** But not absorbing them?

**Mr. Garnett:** Not absorbing them, no, sir.

**Senator Forrestall:** Does your concept of maritime security embrace, as I suggested at the start of my last question, sort of a layer or a tier?

**Mr. Dewar:** It is not so much again a matter of geography in terms of the layers and tiers as a matter of function.

**Senator Forrestall:** One is a product of the other. If it were a boreal forest, it would stop at the edge of the forest. The oceans do not work that way, so I use that analogy of inshore and offshore in that context.

**Mr. Dewar:** Perhaps we could look at another example. We talked about vehicles instead of ships. There is a considerable difference in function between a semi-trailer truck and an army tank and a school bus and a taxi cab, yet they are all vehicles. It is not necessarily the place they are employed as the method and the objective for which they are employed. It is similar with the ships. I think that actually gets to the heart of the question you were asking about the functions of coast guard as needed by the Department of Transport when it was there in terms of maintaining free navigation and voyage and whether you could take that and put it under the navy because they are ships and therefore float and are all in one area. It is not just a matter of the platforms being ships; it is a matter of the function they perform. I have already mentioned the specialization and the training and application and differences in usage that are important in this as well. There are some roles that could be put under the navy, perhaps in terms of vessels designed for interdiction, provided you had the right officers put on board to exercise the functions -- for example, RCMP officers for law enforcement, CIC officers if that were necessary, whatever it happened to be. However, the basic operation and coordination of the vessels could certainly be done by the navy if it were similar in purpose to the vessels they are already operating. Putting in a different set, for example, having the navy doing buoy tending and ice breaking and all those other things just because they were coast guard functions, would be an entirely different thing. It would be a matter of how the resources were managed to be able to do that.

If you go back to the distance study I have seen referred to in previous testimony, there was an intent to optimize fleet usage and avoid redundancy, and certainly everyone wants to make the operation efficient, but there is a limit in how much you can combine the functions and achieve the synergy you are looking for. In terms of basic operation and coordination of fleets, the navy is well suited to doing that because they have the command and control technologies and they are used to doing that sort of thing. Operating a variety of fleets with different functions is not necessarily the most efficient use of all the government's resources.

**Mr. Garnett:** I was the follow-on and a member of the interdepartmental committees after the Osbaldeston study from Defence. It was designed to look at capacity and multitasking of excess capacity of three different fleets. It was more in relation to what they called in those days national roles, more in fishery protection, immigration, those kinds of things. National security per se was not one of the line items that was looked at. It seems to me the difference today is where we are suggesting the same more optimal use of the fleets but with national security as the top requirement. In that case, it would fall under the purview of these security centres or operation centres run by the

navy to have the say to optimize how those fleets are used. That is the difference. They would have the ability to direct them and implement their ops program and say, "Well, maybe you are going over here instead of over there," and then have some capacity, as we discussed, possibly by teams of people on board, in the nearer term, to allow them to perform broader security tasks than they could otherwise perform.

**Senator Forrestall:** I did not mean to mislead you. I know it opposed with respect to the culture integration of the navy. You may recall my interventions with the Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence in trying to get him to consider -- he eventually did, of course -- letting senior tradesmen in their final year join their craft guilds outside so that when they did leave, they had a little seniority.

I am not arguing for that at all. I am not arguing that the navy should be dispatched to move another 100 yards back to the lower or south west of the buoy at the entrance of some harbour.

**Mr. Garnett:** Probably run over it any way.

**Senator Forrestall:** Once or twice. I pause there for a moment. I am not thinking about that at all. I am thinking about the availability to the bus driver of all of the maritime facilities. It seems to me they are inadequate now. Communications, I am sure, are very cordial, and I am sure it is also very slow. You bring to bear in a common problem. It is such a small community on the east coast, a small community on the west coast, and far flung, but everyone knows everyone. As our nation grows over the next 40 or 50 years, you cannot count on that. Therefore, we must rely on something that is fixed, it seems to me, and that functions.

You mentioned search and rescue perhaps could come under the purview of the navy, National Defence. Could you elaborate on that a little bit? Would you see a search and rescue organization perhaps formed and imbued with authority and such, statutory authority particularly, perhaps similar to the RCMP, for example, to bring it into the military?

**Mr. Garnett:** My sense is that the search and rescue centre coordination centres that are collocated with the maritime operations centres in Halifax and Esquimalt function well and are under the local direction of the admiral. My suggestion in my prepared talk was to expand that concept to include the other government departments in conjunction with those operation centres where they would have officials working to expand that notion of how it works now between the coast guard and the armed forces in those centres.

(1910 follows, Senator Forrestall: Would you not go beyond)

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(Following 1900, Mr. Garnett, in those centres. 1910 BEGINS HERE, Senator Forrestall, new speaker:)

**Senator Forrestall:** Would you not go beyond that to include Transport Canada?

**Mr. Garnett:** Not in the hierarchical sense. Certainly, search and rescue functions very well within the confines of the department, and the National Secretariat reports to the Minister of Defence.

**Senator Forrestall:** Is that directly?

**Mr. Garnett:** Yes.

**Senator Cordy:** I like your definitions of national security and maritime security. They are certainly easy for everyone to understand, even someone like me who does not have a background in defence.

You are saying that good maritime security is knowing what is going on in our waters at all times. In order to do that, we have to gather, share and analyze information, and the starting point for that is the sharing of information among government departments. We have heard some witnesses say we are not doing as good a job in that area as we should be because many government departments are involved in national security and maritime security. How do we ensure that agencies and government departments share good information with one another?

**Mr. Garnett:** The answer is the model we have proposed, where senior officials or officers of each of those departments are resident full time in those operation centres. Today, when they are not, they make a decision, consciously or otherwise, of what information they pass. If they are resident within them, they are part of the processing of information and will therefore naturally provide the information they have available.

Furthermore, the intelligence part may well reside for something they know that was happening in Marseille, or it is something that, again, frequently never gets passed between departments because the precise need for that kernel of information is not seen by people remote from those who are integrating the picture.

The key is to have officials from each of the departments working full time in those centres to compile that picture. Once they become part of that, they will bring in the information for their departments. I am absolutely convinced that is the way to make it work.

**Senator Cordy:** When you say the intelligence should be gathered locally, are you talking about the east coast, the west coast and the north?

**Mr. Garnett:** Yes. I am not certain about how you do it in the north to start. The north might be brought a little bit south. There is a northern region command, and more resources are being put in by Defence, but some other issues are up there. My sense is that the option that was proposed by one of your witnesses to build one huge Ottawa centre has perhaps some merit in terms of national decision-making. However, I do not think we would build an Ottawa centre for domestic or Canadian Forces external to Ottawa, et cetera. It seems to me that you get a well-integrated coastal picture east and west, just as NORAD puts a picture together in Colorado Springs, as NATO does in various places around the world, or Canadian joint force headquarters or the admiral in the Persian Gulf. You ship all that information back, and the national centre decides at any one time on what they want to focus, add or integrate.

**Senator Cordy:** With respect to the coastal centres, there would be a national centre. Is that what you are saying?

**Mr. Garnett:** Right, but the coastal centres are where you would do the fundamental work before you send it to the national one.

**Senator Cordy:** Would the coastal centres analyze the information or just gather it? My understanding from listening to a number of witnesses is that we are not doing a bad job of gathering information, but the analyzing is perhaps where we are falling short.

**Mr. Garnett:** I would not want to make a judgment. Information is gathered. Some of it is exchanged into the naval operation centre; some is not. The analysis function is done only by the naval personnel in that centre, the RCMP in its centre or the Coast Guard in its. Everyone is doing a piece of it. It is not being done together. By having the representatives working in that one centre, it seems to me all the information would be integrated in that one centre.

**Mr. Dewar:** It is not just a question of where the centres are located and how they function because, clearly, there is a network that you have to apply and different levels of decision making, whether it is something that is appropriate to be conducted like command and control in the regions for search and rescue, or a higher order activity that requires national decision making.

The location of the centres is one issue, and a number of things are emerging that contribute to solving the type of problem you are posing. Part of that is the technology available now. One of the great difficulties in intelligence work is just the sheer amount of information available out there. If you were to poll what everyone knew around the room, some would be common that we would share, and others would be specialized. I do not necessarily know what you have of the specialized information or what you are missing from the specialized information I have, but there are technologies and ways of managing databases now that are emerging that would allow that information to be shared between different government departments.

However, that then gets to the next level. The technology can solve part of the problem, but policy and procedure issues are also in place. Some of the information is sensitive in terms of the source it comes from, and there is a need to protect those sources. Some of it is considered sensitive on a need-to-know-basis on what needs to be shared in order for people to do their functions, and that needs to be addressed.

Then there are a whole bunch of implications from Charter issues, privacy acts and so forth that need to be addressed. There is as much work needed in that area in determining how the information needs to be shared as there is in sorting out the mechanics of how it can be shared. The mechanical sharing of the information is an easier problem.

**Senator Cordy:** I would like to switch back to Senator Banks' comments about the Coast Guard. I still do not have a clear picture in my mind of the model that you are showing. I understand you were suggesting we could put teams on board the Coast Guard vessels, which makes sense, provided you know what scenario you are coming across. We have heard some witnesses suggest that Coast Guard vessels that come across something they are not expecting do not have the ability to board a ship. Have you thought about that scenario?

**Mr. Dewar:** There are two questions there. One is with respect to putting teams on Coast Guard vessels to do different activities. In most cases, most of the Coast Guard vessels are not suitable to put a team on. If you were doing something because you needed to get someone somewhere under different sea conditions, naval vessels would be more suitable in terms of speed, endurance and capability to go there.

Coast Guard or fisheries vessels could be used, or whatever happens to be available if it were appropriate, but, generally speaking, when you need to put teams on board to do some kind of law enforcement activity, there is a requirement for speed or endurance or other things that may not make a buoy tender or an icebreaker the vessel of choice to do that function. That is part of the sharing and function issue I had addressed before.

Regarding the other question about someone just happening to be in the right place at the right time when something happens, you need to look at the mechanisms for being able to address those. Do you make people have the status of peace officers all the time where they are armed just because they are out there, or do you have a process to deputize them to act in a certain capacity because of the circumstances they are in by asking for permission or being granted that activity? I would suggest that works much like the navy's approach on rules of engagement. You have a number of things you could possibly do, but you are not entitled to do all of them all the time without asking permission, and some things should be handled on a case-by-case basis.

In the testimony I saw from the Coast Guard, there was a suggestion that for 90 per cent of their function, they would prefer to interact with the communities at sea without having those kinds of roles imposed on them. For a lot of activity they do, perhaps that is more suitable.

(1920 follows: Mr. Garnett, new speaker: If the model...)

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(Following take 1910: Mr. Dewar, more suitable. TAKE 1920 BEGINS HERE: New speaker Mr. Garnett)

**Mr. Garnett:** If the model is of the security centre or operations centre having a say in the operation of that vessel in those other 10 per cent of cases where that centre knows there is a risk or a probability of running across or being involved in -- for example, a Coast Guard ship sailing into the Arctic for a period of time -- they would know what that is, and that is somewhere you might wish to place a team, by virtue of the knowledge that centre has. Again, if there is one coordinating or running agency, it would be able to make some of those judgments as to the likelihood of running across something. Today, whether they run across something or not is quite haphazard.

**Senator Cordy:** The better the centres work and the more information you have, the less the likelihood that you will come across something unexpected.

**Mr. Garnett:** That is right.

**Senator Wiebe:** Just to follow up on Senator Cordy's question, let us say that we got our wish and got a central gathering point where all the information was shared, are we collecting enough information? Should we be spending some of our resources to acquire more radar? Is there enough information there to actually do the job if it were shared?

**Mr. Garnett:** You can never have too much information. I think some of your other witnesses have suggested that for a modest investment in more surface wave radars you could cover more

territory in the 98 percentile of coverage. The Arctic is an issue and the surveillance there could be tackled in a variety of ways. One of the ways, about which you have already had testimony, is with unmanned air vehicles. Certainly those that fly for a long time are not cheap, but there is one particular model that looks like an airplane and flies for more than 24 hours at a time. It can have the kind of sensors on it that a manned airplane does. That is the kind of thing that could fly around in the Arctic once a week, twice a month or three times a month. It does not cost as much as a manned vehicle. There is a debate about who runs the joystick or flies it. Of course, pilots want to fly it. A recent version of it actually flew from the west coast of the United States to Australia, did a mission there and flew back to the United States. That was written up in *Time* magazine.

Certainly some of those things need to be considered to provide more information than would otherwise be available by any means that I can imagine of doing surveillance in the Arctic.

**Senator Wiebe:** My next question deals with statements you made in your presentation: The important thing is to maintain a presence in our coastal inland waters, and currently we fall short of this requirement.

Where are we falling short? Is it in the vessels? Is it in the manpower to man those vessels? Is it in the budget to keep those vessels out in the water more, or should we be buying more vessels?

**Mr. Garnett:** The short answer would be "all of the above." I would not want to choose any one of them, but it would be instructive to find out how many ship days there were in the Arctic. How many ship days are there off Baffin Island or the Queen Charlottes?

**Senator Forrestall:** There are a lot more than there were years ago.

**Mr. Garnett:** I am not so sure, senator. We used to send a naval vessel inside up the Cumberland Strait. In the 1970s we sent two or three vessels every year. I know the stretch and the cost to the navy. The navy sent a vessel last summer, I believe, for the first time in a great number of years. You only have the *Louis St. Laurent* that is a fully-capable icebreaker. That is not to say that others cannot go at certain times of the year. It is all of the above.

**Senator Wiebe:** I am not disagreeing with you. We have heard good testimony that will back up that statement. However, the thing that is in the back of my mind is that it is easy for us as a committee to write a report and say to the government, "Look, we need more." The government then says, "We will hire two more people, and therefore we will have more. That has answered your question." It would be nice if we could have a concrete idea, that to have proper surveillance and a proper presence A, B, C and D should be followed, rather than saying, "We have to have more coastal and inland presence." How do we go about doing that? What kind of recommendation?

You do not have the research capability to provide that information, but somewhere someone should have an idea of exactly what kind of materiel we are talking about in regard to making that recommendation.

**Mr. Garnett:** You have to make a judgment as to where you get the biggest bang for the dollar and some sort of prioritization. There are some opportunities that were not there a few years ago, such as unmanned vehicles -- those that are substantive in nature, not the little ones that CIA flies into Yemen -- that provide for a long endurance flight.

Some will argue whether, although they do surveillance, there is a presence by a Global Hawk flying around. If it has red and white and big maple leaf on it and can fly not just at 60,000 feet but maybe at 10,000 feet as well, and does not run into a hunter's Twin Otter, it seems to me it does perform more than just pure surveillance. There is bang there, it seems to me.

**Mr. Dewar:** The other issue could be the platforms that are suitable and how many you need of which. It is a matter of how much return you get for the investment. Ships are expensive. Ships are not necessarily good platforms for conducting surveillance. They are good platforms for interdiction if they are queued and go to the right spot. The real question is how to make sure they are in the right spot to begin with. If you look at where the gaps are in our surveillance capability, it is probably in the wide-area surveillance, the kind of things you can get from the Global Hawk-type UAVs or from the satellite coverage that you can buy commercially, the kind of surveillance you can get from the high frequency standing wave radars in terms of being able to do large area coverage. You can put those expensive resources on to the areas of interests you have, where they can do perhaps more detailed surveillance when they get there. However, to use them as a first point of contact is perhaps

not the best use. If you were to look at the return on the investment and where the gaps are, at this point, based on my experience, it is not just so much in the ships and the ship platforms; it is in the ability to conduct the wide-area surveillance that would allow you to make the best use of those ship resources.

**Senator Wiebe:** Is that more important than having the presence?

**Mr. Dewar:** It certainly helps to find where your presence ought to be.

**Senator Forrestall:** Would that kind of surveillance go to monitoring containers loaded in Singapore? We have the technology, I suspect, to track containers and vessels. Could it function for that purpose as well?

**Mr. Dewar:** The answer is that the technology is there to do that and in fact there are commercial companies that use that sort of technology regularly for their own purposes. There is a question of expense associated with it. How do you make it mandatory for everyone to contribute their information to a larger net? It is like some of the other things we addressed. The technology is actually the easy part of it. It is more challenging to identify where you put the investment and how you enforce it to make it the right regulatory regime. The technology is certainly there to do that.

**The Chairman:** I have several quick questions.

You were talking to the committee about the high endurance cutters that might fill in the gap that currently exists with the platforms they have available.

(Take 1930 follows: The Chairman continuing: You mentioned giving them an icebreaking capacity.)

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(follwng tk 1920--Chair cont platforms they have available. )

You mentioned giving them an ice-breaking capacity. It seems to me that would mean trading off the ice-breaking capacity against something else. Is that a priority area that one should be thinking about? There is a certain romance about the North. There is a certain attractiveness. Prime Minister Diefenbaker stirred the imagination of Canadians when he talked about the North. Having said that, people who are contemplating terrorist acts or an attack on Canada might be better deterred by resources set in places where the usefulness could be better sold and where there are more people.

**Mr. Garnett:** Perhaps I misspoke. I was talking about the ability to operate in first-year ice. That is not ice-breaking; that is just having a hull that allows a vessel to manoeuvre and to drive through first- or second-year ice. I was not intending to talk about ice-breaking generally.

**The Chairman:** You did not misspeak. That is what you said and that is what I heard.

**Mr. Garnett:** It is just a question of thickness and propellers and hull form, more than anything else.

**The Chairman:** I come back to the broader question about how much effort we should be putting into the North. At one time, serious consideration was given to nuclear submarines with the capacity to sail under the ice. The minister who proposed that acquisition is my brother-in-law. I frequently argued with him about what he would do when he found a British or Russian or American submarine under the ice, other than to say, "Hello, we know you are there," and keep on going.

Would we really want to spend a whole lot of resources defending the North? Some things are important. We should check for oil spills and such things. Search and rescue may be needed up there. However, from a military point of view, would you not want your resources further south?

**Mr. Garnett:** First, we are talking about a broad national security framework and not just a threat-based one. We are looking at environmental and ecological questions, as well as the future law of the sea. What will we claim and how will we go about it? I think global warming is factual, although there are some dissenting scientists. In science, there is always a dissenting faction. It is clear that there is less ice and less thickness of ice in the North. Therefore, its utility for resource

extraction, for other uses, is growing. We are not talking about building naval vessels that would only operate in the Arctic. We are talking about some more surveillance and greater presence.

Second, any platform -- and I use that term in a generic sense of vessel or air vehicle -- must be multi-purpose. We will not buy platforms that can only do one thing; they will have to do more than one. The Global Hawk could do Arctic surveillance and off-coast surveillance. In a mission like Afghanistan, it might well provide surveillance in the mountainous areas along the border with Pakistan. I suggest that the Government of Canada and the Department of Defence would not acquire the vessel for just one of those purposes. The vessel we are talking about would try to fill a gap. It would be high-endurance. It would also have some utility that other navy enforcement vessels do not now have, without making it unique to that environment.

**The Chairman:** We are currently doing one Arctic over-flight per year in terms of the sovereignty patrol.

**Mr. Garnett:** We used to do it monthly.

**The Chairman:** Is Canada any less safe?

**Mr. Garnett:** An annual flight is not sufficient.

**The Chairman:** If you are not spotting anything once a month and you are not spotting anything once every two months nor once every three months, sooner or later you do not keep spotting.

**Mr. Garnett:** I once was a mathematician. I think gaming theory would tell you that just because you do not find something once a month does not mean there is not something there 30 other times a month.

**The Chairman:** That is possible, absolutely.

You did not mention satellites; Mr. Dewar did. Are they cost effective? Is there a trade-off to be made between more radar and more satellites? Has anyone done a business case for that?

**Mr. Dewar:** I am not sure. You get different capability from the two systems. Certainly, if you want widest-area coverage, satellite coverage is probably the best delivery method. A number of satellites exist now. That brings us to co-use activities. Some information could be derived from existing satellites and some can be bought commercially. The question is, what do you do with that information and how do you stack it to get that layer of concentric viewpoints to bring focus on matters that really interest you?

In Arctic surveillance, if we watch it all the time, will we necessarily see anything? If we establish the right presence, we can be there when something does happen. In the monthly patrols, we did see things happening in the Arctic. Soviet ice stations were created in the area. Things do happen.

You raised the question of submarines in the Arctic; that was really a military issue. There were reasons for submarines to preferentially operate in that area. Is that threat still there? Perhaps that threat is not as strong as it used to be. Is there a terrorism threat of people coming across the ice pack when there are clearly easier ways of getting here? There probably is not, but environmental issues are also security issues. Scientific research and other input can be derived from satellite imagery to contribute to security, as well as just watching for people who are misbehaving in the area.

**Mr. Garnett:** Much of the satellite information is available to be purchased commercially. If an organized centre is given a certain mandate, it can pick up information when it needs to address a gap in its own systems. That information can be bought from a Russian satellite or from radar sat.

**The Chairman:** We do not buy that information now because resources are scarce and we have concluded that the satellite information is a lower priority than other things.

**Mr. Garnett:** We do not buy it now. I believe the people who run the centres now know that the information is available. Whether any is purchased, I do not know. It was used in exercises when I was an admiral in Halifax. We used radar-sat information and tried to integrate it into the picture during exercises. On occasion, we found remarkable things while using it.

**The Chairman:** With regard to culture, we get a negative reaction from the navy about integrating the Coast Guard. The negative reaction does not seem to be based on operational issues as much as a concern that the navy will be stuck with additional tasks without additional resources. In that way, the role of the navy will be degraded. Is that why we are getting those answers?

**Mr. Garnett:** I think so. It is called the Christmas-tree effect, pinning things on the DND Christmas tree. That has been a favourite game of the Canadian government for a number of years -- additional missions with no additional resources.

**The Chairman:** So it is not a bad idea, apart from the concern that, at the end of the day, the government is scheming to do something on the cheap?

**Mr. Garnett:** That is only part of the concern. The navy's reaction depends on a clear operational relationship. We talked about security centres that can direct or implement operational programs with some degree of control. I do not think the navy would have a problem with that. All those other Coast Guard roles, roles like buoy-tendering and ice-breaking, have nothing to with the navy operations or administration.

(tk 1940 follows--Chair: The concern may be that the budget)

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(Following Mr. Garnett...or administration.)

**The Chairman:** The concern may be that the budget to upgrade the Coast Guard fleet might come at the expense of the navy's budget; is that correct?

**Mr. Garnett:** That would be a concern.

**The Chairman:** On that happy note, I thank you both for coming and appearing before us.

You have brought a perspective that the committee values and appreciates and is quite germane to the work that we are proceeding with today. Your experience and understanding of these issues has been helpful to the committee in moving forward.

To those of you who are following our work, in a few minutes we will hear from Professor Middlemiss, a fellow of foreign policy studies from Dalhousie University; and from Vice Admiral, retired, James King, a former senior Canadian officer as the military representative of Canada to the NATO military committee, in Brussels.

If you have any questions or comments please visit our Web site by going to [WWW.SEN-SEC.CA](http://WWW.SEN-SEC.CA). We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.